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Hugh Dalton

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The Lord Dalton
Dalton in 1940
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster
In office
31 May 1948 – 28 February 1950
Prime MinisterClement Attlee
Preceded byThe Lord Pakenham
Succeeded byThe Viscount Alexander of Hillsborough
Chancellor of the Exchequer
In office
27 July 1945 – 13 November 1947
Prime MinisterClement Attlee
Preceded byJohn Anderson
Succeeded byStafford Cripps
President of the Board of Trade
In office
22 February 1942 – 23 May 1945
Prime MinisterWinston Churchill
Preceded byJohn Llewellin
Succeeded byOliver Lyttelton
Minister of Economic Warfare
In office
15 May 1940 – 22 February 1942
Prime MinisterWinston Churchill
Preceded byRonald Cross
Succeeded byRoundell Palmer
Chairman of the Labour Party
In office
9 October 1936 – 8 October 1937
LeaderClement Attlee
Preceded byJennie Adamson
Succeeded byGeorge Dallas
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
In office
11 June 1929 – 3 September 1931
Prime MinisterRamsay MacDonald
Preceded byAnthony Eden
Succeeded byJames Stanhope
Member of the House of Lords
Lord Temporal
In office
28 January 1960 – 13 February 1962
Life Peerage
Member of Parliament
for Bishop Auckland
In office
14 November 1935 – 18 September 1959
Preceded byAaron Curry
Succeeded byJames Boyden
In office
30 May 1929 – 7 October 1931
Preceded byRuth Dalton
Succeeded byAaron Curry
Member of Parliament
for Peckham
In office
29 October 1924 – 10 May 1929
Preceded byCollingwood Hughes
Succeeded byJohn Beckett
Personal details
Born(1887-08-26)26 August 1887
Neath, Wales
Died13 February 1962(1962-02-13) (aged 74)
Political partyLabour
Alma materKing's College, Cambridge, London School of Economics

Edward Hugh John Neale Dalton, Baron Dalton, PC (16 August 1887 – 13 February 1962) was a British Labour Party economist and politician who served as Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1945 to 1947.[1] He shaped Labour Party foreign policy in the 1930s, opposing pacifism; promoting rearmament against the German threat; and strongly opposed the appeasement policy of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain in 1938. Dalton served in Winston Churchill's wartime coalition cabinet; after the Dunkirk evacuation he was Minister of Economic Warfare, and established Special Operations Executive. As Chancellor, he pushed his policy of cheap money too hard, and mishandled the sterling crisis of 1947. His political position was already in jeopardy in 1947 when he, seemingly inadvertently, revealed a sentence of the budget to a reporter minutes before delivering his budget speech. Prime Minister Clement Attlee accepted his resignation; Dalton later returned to the cabinet in relatively minor positions.

His biographer Ben Pimlott characterised Dalton as peevish, irascible, given to poor judgment and lacking administrative talent.[2] Pimlott also recognised that Dalton was a genuine radical and an inspired politician; a man, to quote his old friend and critic John Freeman, "of feeling, humanity, and unshakeable loyalty to people which matched his talent."[3]

Early life

[edit]

Hugh Dalton was born in Neath in South Wales. His father, John Neale Dalton, was a Church of England clergyman who became chaplain to Queen Victoria, tutor to the princes George (later King George V) and Albert Victor, and a canon of Windsor.

Dalton was educated at Summer Fields School and then at Eton College. He then went to King's College, Cambridge, where he was active in student politics; his socialist views, then very rare amongst undergraduates, earned him the nickname "Comrade Hugh". Whilst at Cambridge he was President of the Cambridge University Fabian Society. He did not succeed in becoming President of the Cambridge Union Society, despite three attempts to be elected Secretary. Dalton's decision as an undergraduate to join the Labour Party gave him the reputation of being a "class traitor" and an "Etonian renegade" who had abandoned the traditional "Establishment" values of someone with an Eton-Cambridge education.[4] Many Conservatives who from the same background of being educated at elite public schools and universities such as Oxford and Cambridge always had a special distaste for Dalton.[4]

He went on to study at the London School of Economics (LSE) and the Middle Temple. During the First World War he was called up into the Army Service Corps, later transferring to the Royal Artillery. In January 1917, he transferred to the Royal Artillery.[4] He served as a lieutenant on the French and Italian fronts, where he was awarded the Italian decoration, the Medaglia di Bronzo al Valor Militare, in recognition of his "contempt for danger" during the retreat from Caporetto; he later wrote a memoir of the war called With British Guns in Italy. Following demobilisation, he returned to the LSE and the University of London as a lecturer, where he was awarded a DSc for a thesis on the principles of public finance in 1920.[5][6]

There have been suggestions that he was homosexual, but they are rejected by his major biographer Ben Pimlott, who states "no evidence exists that Dalton ever had a sexual relationship with another man, and his private life seems to have been one of blameless monogamy."[7] However he does refer to Dalton having "homosexual tendencies", mentioned below.

Political career

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Dalton (right), Minister of Economic Warfare, and Colin Gubbins, chief of the Special Operations Executive, talking to a Czech officer during a visit to Czech troops near Leamington Spa, Warwickshire

Dalton stood unsuccessfully for Parliament four times: at the 1922 Cambridge by-election, in Maidstone at the 1922 general election, in Cardiff East at the 1923 general election, and the 1924 Holland with Boston by-election, before entering Parliament for Peckham at the 1924 general election.

Dalton was unusual amongst Labour MPs, most of whom felt very strongly that the Treaty of Versailles was too harsh towards Germany, and who advocated revising the treaty in favor of Germany.[8] Dalton's war experiences in the First World War had made him something of a Germanphobe.[8] In 1926, he visited Poland and discovered that in the disputed regions of Upper Silesia and the Polish Corridor that German and Polish populations were hopelessly geographically mixed with no clear-cut geographical lines between the two quarrelling communities.[9] As such, Dalton concluded that returning Upper Silesia and the Polish Corridor to Germany would not solve the German-Polish dispute as all that would do would be to transfer Poles into Germany just as transferring Upper Silesia and the Polish Corridor had transferred Germans into Poland.[9] Dalton argued that "wholesale transfers of population" were the only way to achieve "perfection" because otherwise there would always be communities of Poles or Germans on the "wrong" side of the frontier.[9] At the time, Dalton rejected this course and urged the "obliteration" of frontiers between Germany and Poland as the best way of securing peace in Europe, arguing for some sort of German-Polish federation.[9] He recalled about his visit to Poland: "I came away aware for the first time of this most gifted and romantic nation, so brave, so gay, with so much good looks and personal charm in both sexes...It was this visit that finally determined me to try to rewrite the foreign policy of the Labour Party".[10] Dalton wrote the prevailing viewpoint in the Labour Party in the 1920s was "...a silly syllogism 'Everything that came out of the Allied victory in the war and the Treaty of Versailles is bad. Poland came out of all that. Therefore Poland is bad'. But few of these "experts" had ever visited Poland or met typical Poles".[10] In his 1928 book Towards the Peace of Nations, Dalton praised the forced population exchanges between Turkey and Greece in 1922-1923 for it's "cumulatively good" consequences and recommended a similar policy towards Eastern Europe.[9]

At the 1929 general election, he succeeded his wife Ruth Dalton, who retired, as Labour Member of Parliament (MP) for Bishop Auckland. Widely respected for his intellectual achievements in economics, he rose in the Labour Party's ranks, with election in 1925 to the shadow cabinet and, with strong union backing, to the Labour Party National Executive Committee (NEC). He gained ministerial and foreign policy experience as Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office in Ramsay MacDonald's second government, between 1929 and 1931. Starting in 1930, Dalton became a Zionist and strongly supported seeing the Palestine Mandate (modern Israel) ultimately becoming a Jewish state.[11] Most Zionists at the time were socialist, and Dalton in a 1930 speech predicated a future Israeli state would be a "socialist commonwealth".[11] As undersecretary, he clashed with the Foreign Secretary, Arthur Henderson, over Eastern Europe, writing "there was no reason why we should back German claims against Poland, and that moreover, it could not be in British interests to aggrandise at Poland's expense a Germany, which had been and might become again, what Poland could never be, a grim menace to this country".[12] He lost this position as under-secretary when he, and most Labour leaders, rejected MacDonald's National Government. As with most other Labour MPs, he lost his seat in 1931; he was elected again in 1935.

Dalton published Practical Socialism for Britain, a bold and highly influential assessment of a future Labour government's policy options, in 1935. The book revived updated nuts-and-bolts Fabianism, which had been out of favour, and could be used to attack the more militant Left. His emphasis was on using the state as a national planning agency, an approach that appealed well beyond Labour.[13] Dalton had the reputation of being "a brilliant man, but rash, hot-headed and impulsive, a shinning diamond of mercurial, unstable gifts with a penchant for self-damage".[14] He was considered to be one of the most intelligent of the Labour MPs who was destined for high office should Labour win a general election, but also someone who had a self-destructive streak owning to his vanity and impulsive tendencies.[14]

Foreign policy

[edit]

Turning his attention to the looming crisis in Europe, he became the Labour Party's spokesman on foreign policy in Parliament. In May 1935, he wrote in his diary that Clement Attlee had given a speech in Smethwick in the West Midlands on the topic of the looming tensions between Japan and China, which he predicated could cause another world war.[15] Dalton judged the speech a failure as he wrote: "And he talked about the Sino-Jap dispute!...Infinitely remote from the audience in both time and space".[15] Dalton had a very Euro-centric conception of British foreign policy and tended to see Japan's imperialistic policy towards China as a far lesser concern compared to the potential threat posed by Nazi Germany.[16]

Pacifism was a strong element in Labour Party, but the Spanish Civil War in 1936-1939 changed that, as the Left moved to support arms for the Republican ("Loyalist") cause. During his time in the shadow cabinet, Dalton was one of the leaders of the anti-fascist wing of the Labour Party who clashed with the anti-war wing of Labour.[17] The Labour Party was divided between one faction that was opposed to all war on principle vs. another that was willing to support war against fascist aggression, and as one of the leaders of the latter faction, Dalton frequently fought against the pacifistic faction of Labour.[17] In September 1936, Dalton visited Paris to see the French Premier Léon Blum.[18] He sharply criticised Blum for not offering more aid to the Spanish Republic, only to be countered by Blum who stated he was afraid of causing a civil war in France if intervened in Spain.[18] However Dalton was not enthusiastic for the Labour party policy of wanting to intervene,[19] later stating:

I was far from enthusiastic for the slogan "arms for Spain" if this meant, as some of my friends eagerly did, that we were to supply arms which otherwise we should keep for ourselves, for I was much more conscious than most of my friends of the terrible insufficiency of British armaments against the German danger.[20]

His views were different from those of Attlee, later recalling that before the Second World War he believed:

as Germany and Italy were potential enemies of Britain and Franco was their ally, it was in Britain's interest that Franco should not win the Spanish Civil War. It was on this proposition rather than any extravagant eulogy of the Spanish Government that I based most of my public references to this most tragic struggle.[20]

Yet Dalton admitted he was wrong in this assessment of British interests, stating that "When the Germans overran France in 1940 and reached the Pyrenees, Franco was neutral, and with remarkable skill maintained his neutrality until the end of the war. Hitler respected this and never forced his way through Spain to attack Gibraltar or crossed the Straits into Morocco." and "Hitler would not have respected the neutrality of a Spanish Republican Government. If Franco had lost the Civil War, Hitler would have occupied Spain."[20]

Aided by union votes, Dalton moved the party from semi-pacifism to a policy of armed deterrence and rejection of appeasement. He was a bitter enemy of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain. Dalton in his speeches to the House of Commons charged that the government during the Sudetenland crisis was deliberately trying to exclude the Soviet Union from any role in the crisis despite the fact that Soviet Union had alliances with both France and Czechoslovakia.[21] In a speech to the House of Commons, he stated: "There are some in this country who apparently think it worthwhile and a good bargain to try to push the Soviet Union out of Europe".[21] In a letter to Robert Vansittart, Dalton wrote: "It was amazing how some people, otherwise intelligent, had a fixture about Russia and seemed almost to prefer that this country should be defeated in war without Russian aid rather than win with it".[21]

During the Sudetenland crisis, Dalton frequently defended the Soviet stance.[22] Dalton was a strong supporter of the League of Nations and its principles of collective security, and believed that should be the basis of an Anglo-Soviet alliance.[23] Dalton was attached to the principle of collective security rather than alliance with the Soviet Union per se, and stated if the Soviet Union should invade Germany, Britain should come to Germany's aid, and likewise favored coming to aid of the Soviet Union should Germany invade.[23] Dalton stated that what he really wanted was "a system of mutual guarantee against aggression in Europe".[23] As the Soviet Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov frequently praised the League of Nations and collective security in his speeches, it was under these grounds that Dalton advocated an Anglo-Soviet alliance rather in support of communism.[23] Despite his public support for an Anglo-Soviet alliance, in private Dalton admitted that the Soviet Union was "an enigma".[24] Joseph Stalin was a very remote, mysterious figure who rarely spoke in public or saw foreigners, making it extremely difficult to determine how much Litvinov was supported by Stalin. Dalton wrote in his diary: "This is the most difficult gap in one's knowledge to get filled in...what would they do? No one in this country seemed to know".[23] In the crisis, Dalton was in close contact with Charles Corbin, the French ambassador; Jan Masaryk, the Czechoslovak minister; and Ivan Maisky, the Soviet ambassador.[25] The most controversial of his contacts was with Maisky who regularly leaked information about the crisis to Dalton, which he used to attack the government during question time in the House of Commons.[25] Dalton visited the Soviet embassy in London on a frequent basis to confer with Maisky and pick up information.[26]

Under the terms of the 1935 Soviet-Czechoslovak alliance, the Soviet Union was only obligated to go to war if the 1924 Franco-Czechoslovak alliance were activated first in the event of aggression against Czechoslovakia. About the charge that the Soviets were acting in bad faith by only promising to go to war if France did so first, Dalton charged that Moscow was acting in accord with the text of the Soviet-Czechoslovak alliance.[22] About the lack of a Soviet-Czechoslovak border, Dalton believe it was possible for Britain to pressure Poland and Romania into granting the Red Army transit rights to aid Czechoslovakia.[27] At a meeting with Chamberlain on 17 September 1938, Dalton criticised the latter for accepting at face value the claims of the French foreign minister Georges Bonnet that the Soviet Union would do nothing if Germany invaded Czechoslovakia, and therefore it was foolish to trust the promises from the Soviet foreign commissar Maxim Litvinov who claimed otherwise.[22] Bonnet had told Chamberlain that Litvinov had told Jean Payart, the French charge d'affairs in Moscow, that his government's talk of defending Czechoslovakia was empty buster.[22] Dalton recalled: "The PM said that Bonnet, in consequence of this conversation, entertained grave doubts about whether the SU meant to do anything. At that point, I said 'I must say Mr. Prime Minister that I do not believe this story. It is quite contrary to what I have heard from more than one good source on which I place reliance...This conversation, moreover, is quite inconsistent, with the clear, repeated, and recent statements by the Soviet if France moved, she would move at once'".[22] Dalton was well aware that the Yezhovschina had wrecked the Red Army at least for the moment, but still felt that the Soviet Union was the only power capable of engaging with the Germany in Eastern Europe, and was worth having as an ally against the Reich.[28] In a speech in the House of Commons, Dalton asked Chamberlain "would it not be worth something to have the Red Army and Red Airforce on our side instead of being neutral? The Prime Minister claims for himself the title of a realist, but does not any realistic foreign policy in this country necessarily include an attempt to make sure that, if the worse should come, we should have that enormous potential on our side instead of being immobilised?...Is it not a clear calculation that if it can be shown in advance that there would be a combined force arrayed against an aggressor, which would include the Soviet Union, we should be more much likely to avoid war?"[28] Like most other British anti-appeasers, Dalton did not war a war with the Reich, and instead believed an alliance of the Soviet Union, France, and Britain would be sufficient to cause Germany to back down from its demands on Czechoslovakia.[28] On 30 September 1938, the crisis was ended by a conference in Munich that agreed that the Sudetenland would be ceded to Germany over the course of October 1938. During the debates on the Munich Agreement in the House of Commons, Dalton criticised the agreement as giving too much to Adolf Hitler in exchange for a written promise that he would not start a war with Britain.[17] The British historian Louise Shaw noted that Dalton like the other anti-appeasers advocated a foreign policy that made sense in deterrence terms, but did not address the practical questions if the crisis turned to war.[29] Dalton assumed if the crisis came to war, the Dominions would all join Britain.[29] In fact only New Zealand had committed itself to do so while South Africa, Australia and Canada all indicated a distinct unwillingness to go to war for Czechoslovakia. Likewise, Dalton assumed if war came, Poland and Romania would give transit rights for the Red Army to defend Czechoslovakia, which was not the case.[29]

On 15 March 1939, Germany occupied the Czech half of Czecho-Slovakia. Later that same day, Hitler during his visit to Prague proclaimed the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia. On 16 March 1939, Dalton played a leading role in the debates in the House of Commons about the end of Czechoslovak independence.[30] Under the Munich Agreement, Britain had promised a "guarantee" of Czecho-Slovakia (as Czechoslovakia had been renamed in October 1938) against aggression in exchange for the Sudetenland being allowed to "go home to the Reich". Dalton in his speech to the House of Commons noted bitterly that Germany had just violated the Munich Agreement and that the British "guarantee" had proven worthless.[30] Dalton stated that Chamberlain "should disappear from office", saying that the only decent thing left for him to do would be to resign immediately.[30] Dalton called the newly declared state of Slovakia a sham as he stated the Slovak declaration of independence "had been paid for by German money...and organised by German agents"..[30] Dalton called the Slovak declaration of independence "a convenient legal let-ago of the guarantee" as Chamberlain insisted that the "guarantee" was not longer valid as Czecho-Slovakia had ceased to exist on 14 March even before the Germans marched in on 15 March.[30] In response to several Conservative MPs who called Czechoslovakia an "artificial" state created by the Treaty of Versailles, Dalton called Czechoslovakia "a once free and happy model democracy in Central Europe" and noted pointedly that he had actually visited Czechoslovakia a number of times, unlike his critics who had never been there.[30] Dalton ended his speech by warning of "a rapidly increasing danger to Britain", supported the idea put forward by the former Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden for a bloc of states to resist further aggression and urged a barrier to further aggression under the slogan "thus far, but no further".[30]

On the evening of 30 March 1939, Dalton along with Arthur Greenwood visited 10 Dowding Street where they were informed by Chamberlain that he planned to announce the British "guarantee" of Poland in a speech in the House of Commons the next day.[31] Dalton expressed his approval of the "guarantee" of Poland, but told Chamberlain that he "would never get away with it...unless he brought in the Russians".[31] During the Danzig crisis, Dalton supported Chamberlain's policy of creating a "peace front" to deter Germany from invading Poland, but was opposed to Chamberlain's policy of making Poland the eastern pivot of the proposed "peace front" rather than the Soviet Union.[32] Dalton argued that Poland was too weak to play the role of the eastern pivot, and only the Soviet Union had the sufficient industrial and military capacity to engage in war with Germany.[32] In particular, Dalton charged that Chamberlain was inept in offering the "guarantee" of Poland without any conditions as he noted that Britain had no leverage over the Polish foreign minister, Colonel Józef Beck, into granting transit rights to the Red Army in the event of a German invasion of Poland.[33] The issue of transit rights became of a cardinal importance during the Danzig crisis as the Soviets refused to sign an alliance with Britain and France unless Poland gave transit rights first, which Colonel Beck was utterly opposed to granting.[33] In April 1939, Dalton strongly criticised the Chamberlain government's unwillingness to seriously negotiate, noting that the British government took days and sometimes weeks to respond to Soviet offers of an alliance, which he denounced as negoriating in bad faith.[34] In June 1939, Dalton along with Churchill and Lloyd George were the only MPs to support the Soviet claim to offer a "guarantee" to Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania along with the Soviet concept of "indirect aggression".[35] But Dalton was not a partisan of the Soviet line, and in July 1939 told Maisky that his government was partly to blame for the slow pace of the talks and the failure to reach a joint Anglo-Soviet "guarantee" of Romania.[36] At another meeting with Maisky in July he supported Chamberlain's demand that the Soviet Union issue a "guarantee" of Belgium and the Netherlands to complement the "guarantee" that Chamberlain had issued in February.[36] Dalton told Maisky that the Soviet claim his government had no interest in the Low Countries was "sheer tripe" under the grounds "there will be a war in which the SU is engaged in or not".[36] As the talks moved at a sluggish pace, and word of the abrasive negotiating style of the new Soviet foreign commissar Vyacheslav Molotov, Dalton was forced to concede in the summer that the Soviets were in part to blame.[36] Dalton wrote in his diary that he was faced with dilemma: "Either we press the government or not. In the first case we may encourage the Russians to be more difficult and be represented by ministers here as impeding negotiations...In other cases, we are taken to acquiescing in HMG's conduct of negotiations and make our supporters in the country impatient".[36] Dalton approved of Chamberlain's handling of the Tientsin incident, saying in August 1939 that there was no need for a statement on the crisis in Tientsin (modern Tianjin) as "I am watching Europe day by day" as he felt that the crisis in Danzig (modern Gdańsk) to be far more important.[37]

Hugh Dalton was among the 2,300 names of prominent persons listed on the Nazis' Special Search List, of those who were to be arrested on the invasion of Great Britain and turned over to the Gestapo.

Second World War

[edit]

Dalton had long considered himself a Polonophile and was close to Count Edward Raczyński, the Polish ambassador to the court of St. James.[38] After war was declared, Dalton threw himself into support for Poland and in a speech on 11 September 1939 denounced the Chamberlain government for not providing any military support for Poland, saying "to sacrifice an Eastern Front altogether is a tremendous price to pay for whatever advantages are supposed to result from air inactivity in the West".[38] The same day, Dalton went to see Sir Kingsley Wood, the Air Secretary, to demand that he be flown into Poland to assist the Polish war effort.[38] Wood rejected that request under the grounds that "the scheme was not considered advisable".[38] Dalton continued to lobby ministers in the government to open a strategical bombing offensive against Germany until 27 September 1939 when Warsaw surrendered after being besieged.[38] At a party hosted by Count Raczyński at the Polish embassy on 18 November 1939, Dalton first met Colonel Colin Gubbins who had served with the British military mission in Poland and had escaped via Romania.[39] Gubbins made such a positive impression on Dalton that the next year he was to insist that Gubbins served as the military head of the Special Operations Executive.[39]

When war came, Chamberlain's position became untenable after many Conservative MPs refused to support him in the Norway Debate in April 1940, and Dalton and other senior Labour leaders made clear they would join any coalition government except one headed by Chamberlain. After Chamberlain resigned early in May, and Lord Halifax had declined the position, Winston Churchill became prime minister. During Churchill's coalition government (1940–45) Dalton was Minister of Economic Warfare from 1940 to 1942. On 14 May 1940, Churchill phoned Dalton who was attending a Labour Party conference in Bournemouth to tell him: "Your friends tell me that you made a considerable study of economic warfare. Will you take that ministry?"[4] Dalton answered: "I should be very glad to do so. I am proud to serve under you".[4] He established the Special Operations Executive, and was later a member of the executive committee of the Political Warfare Executive. The British historian Matthew Frank called Dalton "a particularly duplicitous, cunning and vain politician with an overbearing and forceful personality" who exercised more influence on government policy than what his titles would suggest.[40] Dalton was widely respected, but also disliked amongst in the cabinet. His fellow Labour MP Emmanuel Shinwell called him "the most wicked man in politics I've known".[10] The Conservative MP Brendan Bracken said Dalton was "the biggest bloodiest shit I've met!"[10] Dalton greatly admired Churchill who by contrast could not stand him, once joking "Dr. Dalton as he calls himself, though I have yet to hear of a patient he has cured".[10] Churchill once remarked "Keep that man away from me. I can't stand his booming voice and shifty eyes".[10] The British historian Terry Charman wrote Dalton was greatly respected for his intelligence and dynamism, but that he had "a very abrasive and bullying personality" that alienated many.[10]

In a book published in 1940 entitled Hitler's War: Before and After, Dalton argued that forced population exchanges were the solution to the problems of Eastern Europe as he argued that both the Sudetenland crisis and the Danzig crisis had proved that the existence of German minorities in Eastern Europe was being used as a pretext for German aggression.[9] Dalton argued to prevent a repeat of the German complaints about the Polish Corridor that East Prussia should be annexed to Poland after the war.[9] He approved of an offer made by the German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop on 30 August 1939 for a forced population exchange between Germany and Poland, and stated after an Allied victory an "organised movement of population" be carried out under the auspices of "an impartial arbiter".[40] He also called for expelling the entire German community of the Sudetenland as the "indisputable condition of future tranquility".[41]

SOE is most famous for its operations in France, but in 1940 Dalton was highly dismissive of any possibility of resistance in France, writing "the French are too much attached to their mistresses and their soup and their little properties. We see right before our eyes nothing less than the liquification of France".[42] Dalton had insisted upon making Gubbins the military head of SOE and he reported to duty on 18 November 1940.[43] As Poland was the only country in 1940 where guerilla warfare was actually being waged, primarily by the Polish Army soldiers who had retreated to the forests in 1939, Dalton had a special interest in Poland. Besides for Gubbins, Dalton's main liaison was Stanisław Kot, the minister of interior in the Polish government-in-exile.[43] On 18 June 1940, General Władysław Sikorski ordered the Union of Armed Struggle resistance group to cease their guerilla attacks as "pointless" as too many Poles were being executed by the Germans in retaliation and to limit their activities for the time being to intelligence-gathering.[44] Despite Sikorski's orders, Dalton still saw the Polish resistance as SOE's "principle asset" in 1940 and was very keen to have the guerilla war in Poland renewed.[43] Dalton had pressed since the summer of 1940 for the Royal Air Force to make available aircraft to parachute in SOE agents to make contact with the Polish resistance, a request that was finally approved by the Air Ministry in late 1940.[45] Dalton Christmas 1940 in Scotland as the guest of General Sikorski where he reviewed the Polish divisions that been had stationed in Scotland.[43] Besides for making speeches, Dalton's visit to Scotland was to make contact with the Sixth Bureau (Polish military intelligence) in order to find volunteers for the SOE.[43] The first flight taking three Polish SOE agents, namely Stanisław Krzymowski, Jozef Zabielski and Czeslaw Raczkowski, to Poland took place on 15 February 1941.[46] Dalton was overjoyed when the news reached him that the three Polish agents had reached Warsaw and made contact with the Resistance, which he saw as the beginning of a great revolt in Poland.[46] Dalton did not seem to understand that Poland was at the extreme range of British aircraft and that his plans to fly in a massive number of weapons and agents as the prelude for sending in entire airborne division with the aim of launching a revolt were unrealistic.[47] An attempt to send SOE agents into the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia was less successful. Dalton and Gubbins met with Edvard Beneš, the president of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile, and his intelligence chief František Moravec, and secured the promise that a dozen Czech servicemen would volunteer for SOE.[48] Just before the flight to send the Czech SOE agents into the Protectorate was set to take off, the mission was "gazumped" by MI6 who claimed the agent who was to serve as the radio operator for themselves, thereby causing the mission to be aborted.[48]

He became President of the Board of Trade in 1942; the future Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell, drafted into the civil service during the war, was his Principal Private Secretary. In this position he tackled the price rings. Dalton was very close to Edvard Beneš and supported his plans to expel the entire Sudeten German community after the war, saying the Sudetenland crisis of 1938 had proven that Sudeten Germans were not loyal to Czechoslovakia.[41] In May 1942, Dalton told General Władysław Sikorski that he supported Poland after the war annexing the "whole East Prussian coast and Danzig" and that the Poles should "drive out" all of the Germans living there.[41] Dalton often argued that forced population transfer between Greece and Turkey in 1922-1923 should be the model for solving the problems of minorities in Eastern Europe as he argued for populations transfers as the best way of preventing future wars.[9] In May 1943, Dalton told Philip Noel-Baker that "we should not try to make frontiers fit the perverse distribution of racial populations, assumed to be immobile. The repatriation of the Greek minority from Turkey and the more recent, and incredibly more brutal movements ordered by Hitler show what can be done".[49]

Starting on 23 June 1943, Dalton as chairman of Labour's international sub-committee was charged with drawing up a Labour government's post-war foreign policy in order to rebut the charge that Labour only spoke in abstract terms about foreign policy.[50] Dalton's principle concern in his paper was Germany, which he wanted to totally disarmed forever and possibly broken up into several new states.[51] Because German aggression in Eastern Europe had been justified under the grounds that Germany was protecting the volksdeutsche (ethnic German) minorities, Dalton advocated expelling all of the volksdeutsche into Germany.[51] Dalton wrote that the Treaty of Versailles was flawed because it left all of their peoples of Eastern Europe in their places and imposed a series of minority treaties on the states of Eastern Europe designed to protect the rights of minorities, which had provided an excuse for German aggression.[52] Dalton wrote: "This time, the frontiers have been drawn, having regard to geographical and economic convenience, all national minorities should be encouraged to join the national states to which they belong. In particular, all Germans left outside the post-war frontiers of Germany should be encouraged to "go home to the Reich". It will indeed be in their interests to do so, and in good time, because their victims will be on their tracks. Such movements of population will be a small affair compared with the gigantic "general post" which Hitler has set going all over Europe, and the vast post-war problem of the repatriation of prisoners and exiles. The transfer of the population between Turkey and Greece was an outstanding success. This is a precedent to be followed. It settled the question once and for all with no hang-over".[52]

In his first draft presented on 12 November 1943, Dalton stated he favored continuing the "Big Three" alliance of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom to become "the solid nucleus of a world organization" working together to uphold peace after the war.[51] He also called for Allied occupations of both Japan and Germany; for both Japan and Germany to be completely disarmed forever; and for Anglo-American-Soviet control of the German economic and financial system.[53] Much of his paper was given over to German "responsibility" for the war and war crimes.[53] Dalton argued that millions of Germans were involved in Nazi war crimes in one way or another as he stated the German working class which was "doing their utmost" to sustain the German war effort by building weapons for the Wehrmacht were just as guilty of war crimes as members of the National Socialist German Workers' Party and the Wehrmacht.[54] Dalton wrote that there were "good Germans", but "they are singularly ineffective in restraining the bad Germans."[54] In a repudiation of the protectionism that characterised the world economy in the Great Depression, Dalton called for a comprehensive effort to lower tariffs on both goods and services for the entire world as he argued Britain would benefit from more free trade and less protectionism.[54]

The principle objection to Dalton's paper came from the Labour MP Philip Noel-Baker who disliked the idea of the leaders of the "Big Three" alliance deciding the fate of the world and wanted some sort of international organisation to be in charge of the post-war world.[55] In the final draft submitted on 7 March 1944, Dalton called for the permanent disarmament of Germany; a lengthy occupation of Germany; the reduction of any industry that could be used for military purposes and international control of the German economy; punishment for all war criminals; for Germany to pay reparations to the Allied powers; and the expulsion of the volksdeutsche minorities from Eastern Europe with the only exceptions being for those willing to be "loyal subjects".[56] The sections dealing with Germany drew objections from Noel-Baker, Harold Laski and Jim Griffiths who complained about the call for reparations and Dalton's use of the word "German" in place of "Nazi", which seemed to imply a sort of collective guilt for the Germans.[57] Noel-Baker in particular objected to Dalton's sentence about "the calculated German plan to kill all Jews in Europe", saying he wanted the statement to instead say "the calculated Nazi plan to kill all the Jews in Europe".[58] Dalton also declared his support for Zionism as his paper called for a post-war Labour government to work to establish a Jewish state in the Palestine Mandate after the war.[59] On Palestine, Dalton wrote that Jews should be encouraged to "enter this tiny land in such numbers as to become a majority. There was a strong case for this before the War. There is an irresistible case now, after the unspeakable atrocities of the cold and calculated German Nazi plan to kill all the Jews in Europe. Here too, in Palestine surely is a case on human grounds, to promote a stable settlement, for the transfer of population. Let the Arabs be encouraged to move out as the Jews move in".[60] Dalton argued that Palestine was less than half the size of Wales; that the Arab world was large; and the Palestinians should be financially compensated for agreeing to leave Palestine.[61] Finally, he called for extending the size of the projected Jewish state and called for talks with Egypt, Syria and Transjordan (modern Jordan) about transferring more territory.[62] Dalton's paper drew opposition from Aneurin Bevan who charged that his paper was too harsh towards Germany and would drive the Germans towards supporting the Nazi regime, which was clearly losing the war by this point.[63] Dalton's paper was accepted as the basis for a Labour government's post-war foreign policy at a conference in London between 11-15 December 1944.[64] Despite the pro-Zionist stance of his paper, Dalton's statements about "population transfers" as the solution to problems of Palestine created opposition from the Jewish Agency (the semi-official agency in charge of the Jewish population of Palestine), which feared that would rule out any possibility of a compromise with the Palestinian Arabs.[65]

Chancellor of the Exchequer

[edit]

Appointment

[edit]

After the unexpected Labour victory in the 1945 general election Dalton wished to become Foreign Secretary, but the job was instead given to Ernest Bevin. Dalton, with his skills in economics, became Chancellor of the Exchequer. Alongside Bevin, Clement Attlee, Herbert Morrison and Stafford Cripps, Dalton was one of the "Big Five" of the Labour government.[66]

In his biography of Attlee and Churchill, Leo McKinstry wrote: "Attlee had initially decided that two of the other most vital jobs, the Treasury and the Foreign Office, should be filled by Bevin and Dalton respectively. But the King had baulked at the idea of Dalton as Foreign Secretary, seeing him as untrustworthy and partisan. Similarly, the Foreign Office exerted pressure against Dalton, the outgoing Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden declaring that ‘it should be Bevin’."[67] In 1944, Dalton, a Zionist called for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. He argued for population transfer, stating, "Let the Arabs be encouraged to move out, as the Jews move in." He went even further and discussed the possibility of "extending the present Palestinian boundaries, by agreement with Egypt, Syria, or Trans-Jordan." In private, Dalton often referred to people of color as "diseased nigger communities" or "wogs."[68] Between 1945-1948, the three principle Zionist groups in Palestine, the Haganah on the left and the Irgun and Lehi (which the British called the "Stern Gang") on the right waged a guerrilla struggle against the British. Dalton for all his support for Zionism was described as being "appalled" by the attacks on British soldiers and policemen, especially by the ruthless tactics of the Irgun and Stern Gang.[69]

Economic policy

[edit]

The Treasury faced urgent problems. Half of the wartime economy had been devoted to mobilizing soldiers, warplanes, bombs and munitions; an urgent transition to a peacetime budget was necessary, while minimizing inflation. Financial aid through Lend Lease from the United States was abruptly and unexpectedly terminated in September 1945, and new loans and cash grants from the United States and Canada were essential to keep living conditions tolerable. In the long run, Labour was committed to nationalization of industry and national planning of the economy, to more taxation of the rich and less of the poor, and to expanding the welfare state and creating free medical services for everyone.[13]

Dalton in 1962

During the war, most overseas investments had been sold to fund the cost of its prosecution (the state thus losing the income from them), and Britain suffered severe balance of payments problems. The $3.75 billion 50-year American loan negotiated by John Maynard Keynes in 1946 (and the $1.25 billion loan from Canada) was soon exhausted. By 1947, rationing had to be tightened and the convertibility of the pound suspended. In the atmosphere of crisis, Morrison and Cripps intrigued to replace Attlee with Bevin as prime minister; Bevin refused to play along, and Attlee bought off Cripps by giving him Morrison's responsibilities for economic planning. Ironically, of the "Big Five" it was Dalton who ultimately fell victim to the events of that year.

Cheaper money—that is, low interest rates—was an important goal for Dalton during his Chancellorship. He wanted to avoid the high interest rates and unemployment experienced after the First World War, and to keep down the cost of nationalization. He gained support for this cheaper money policy from Keynes, as well as from officials of the Bank of England and the Treasury.[70]

Budget

[edit]

Budgetary policy under Dalton was strongly progressive, as characterised by policies such as increased food subsidies, heavily subsidised rents to council house tenants, the lifting of restrictions on housebuilding, the financing of national assistance and family allowances, and extensive assistance to rural communities and Development Areas.[66] Dalton was also responsible for funding the introduction of Britain's universal family allowances scheme, doing so "with a song in my heart", as he later put it.[71][72]

In one of his budgets, Dalton significantly increased spending on education (which included £4 million for the universities and the provision of free school milk), £38 million for the start (from August 1946) of family allowances, and an additional £10 million for Development Areas. In addition, the National Land Fund was established. Harold Macmillan, who inherited Dalton's housing responsibilities, later acknowledged his debt to Dalton's championing of New Towns, and was grateful for the legacy of Dalton's Town Development Bill, which encouraged urban overfill schemes and the movement of industry out of cities.[13]

Food subsidies were maintained at high wartime levels in order to restrain living costs, while taxation structures were altered to benefit low-wage earners, with some 2.5 million workers taken out of the tax system altogether in Dalton's first two budgets. There were also increases in surtax and death duties, which were opposed by the Opposition. According to one historian, Dalton's policies as Chancellor reflected "an unprecedented emphasis by central government on the redistribution of income".[73]

Budget-leaking and resignation

[edit]

Walking into the House of Commons to give the autumn 1947 budget speech, Dalton made an off-the-cuff remark to a journalist, telling him of some of the tax changes in the budget. The news was printed in the early edition of the evening papers before he had completed his speech, and whilst the stock market was still open. This was a scandal, and led to his resignation for leaking a budget secret.[74] He was succeeded by Stafford Cripps. Though initially implicated in the allegations that led to the Lynskey tribunal in 1948, he was ultimately exonerated officially, but his reputation suffered another blow.[75]

Return to cabinet

[edit]
The paved surface of the Pennine Way on Black Hill in the Peak District National Park

Dalton returned to the cabinet in 1948, as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, making him a minister without portfolio. He became Minister of Town and Country Planning in 1950, the position being renamed as Minister of Local Government and Planning the following year. An avid outdoorsman, he served a term as president of the Ramblers Association, which promoted walking tours.[76] As Chancellor in 1946 he had started the National Land Fund to resource national parks, and in 1951 he approved the Pennine Way, which involved the creation of 70 additional miles of rights of way. He still had the ear of the Prime Minister, and enjoyed promoting the careers of candidates with potential, but was no longer a major political player as he had been until 1947. In October 1950, a group of intellectuals from Communist China led by the writer Liu Ningyi visited Britain, and Dalton along with Bevan were assigned to meet the Chinese delegation.[77] Liu read out a threatening statement saying that China would "not stand aside" from the Korean War and would intervene (in fact, Chinese forces had already crossed the Yalu river into North Korea) and accused the Labour government of being unfriendly towards China.[77] In response, an angry Dalton told Liu that he had not met anyone who represented "real British" opinion and compared his visit, meeting only people associated with the British Communist Party, to a Labour Party delegation in China ruled by the Kuomingtang.[77] In November-December 1950, Dalton expressed much concern about the Korean War escalating into a Third World War, arguing that the world was in a highly dangerous situation when China and the United States fighting each other in Korea.[78] Dalton urged Attlee to visit Washington D.C. to meet the American president Harry S. Truman to seek assurances that the United States would not use nuclear weapons and/or seek to escalate the Korean war into an all-out Sino-American war.[78] Attlee visited Washington between 4-8 December 1959 for an emergency summit with Truman and reported that Truman had ruled out the use of nuclear weapons and escalation of the war.[78] In 1951, the writer Monica Felton visited North Korea, China and the Soviet Union.[79] In a radio broadcast from Moscow, she accused American forces of committing Nazi-style crimes in Korea.[79] Upon her return to Britain, Dalton had her fired from the Ministry of Local Government.[79] He left government after Labour lost the 1951 general election.

Personal life

[edit]

In 1914 Dalton married Ruth with whom he had a daughter who died in infancy in the early 1920s.[80]

Dalton's biographer, Ben Pimlott, suggests that Dalton had homosexual tendencies but concludes he never acted on them.[81] Michael Bloch, on the other hand, thinks that Dalton's love for Rupert Brooke, whom he met at Cambridge University's Fabian Society, went beyond the platonic, citing bike rides in the countryside and sleeping naked under the stars.[82]

In 1908, Dalton also made advances at James Strachey, "waving an immense steaming penis in his face and chuckling softly",[83] as Brooke reported to James' brother Lytton. In later life, Dalton seems to have refrained from sexual relationships with men, though he kept a fatherly interest in the career of various young men (such as Hugh Gaitskell, Richard Crossman and Tony Crosland, who had been noted for their good looks and had had same-sex experiences at Oxford) and was rather touchy-feely with them.[82]

In 1951, Dalton wrote to Crossman: "Thinking of Tony, with all his youth and beauty and gaiety and charm... I weep. I am more fond of that young man than I can put into words."[84] According to Nicholas Davenport,[85] Dalton's unrequited feelings for Crosland became an embarrassing joke within the Labour Party.

Dalton's papers, including his diaries, are held at the LSE Library. His diaries have been digitised and are available on LSE's Digital Library.[86]

Awards

[edit]

Dalton was president of the Ramblers' Association from 1948 to 1950, and Master of the Drapers' Company in 1958–59. He was created a life peer as Baron Dalton, of Forest and Frith in the County Palatine of Durham on 28 January 1960.[87][88]

Contributions in economics

[edit]

Dalton substantially expanded Max Otto Lorenz's work in the measurement of income inequality, offering both an expanded array of techniques but also a set of principles by which to comprehend shifts in an income distribution, thereby providing a more compelling theoretical basis for understanding relationships between incomes (1920).

Following a suggestion by Pigou (1912, p. 24), Dalton proposed the condition that a transfer of income from a richer to a poorer person, so long as that transfer does not reverse the ranking of the two, will result in greater equity (Dalton, p. 351). This principle has come to be known as the Pigou–Dalton principle (see, e.g., Amartya Sen, 1973).

Dalton offered a theoretical proposition of a positive functional relationship between income and economic welfare, stating that economic welfare increases at an exponentially decreasing rate with increased income, leading to the conclusion that maximum social welfare is achievable only when all incomes are equal.[89]

Arms

[edit]
Coat of arms of Hugh Dalton
Coronet
Coronet of a baron
Crest
A Griffin or Demi-Dragon issuant Vert wings ouvert
Escutcheon
Azure semḗe of Cross Crosslets a Lion rampant guardant Or
Motto
Inter Cruces Triumphans In Cruce[90]

References

[edit]
  1. ^ Kaderbhai, Nick (2024). "Capitalism, Sovereignty, and Planning in Hugh Dalton's Interwar International Thought". The International History Review: 1–28. doi:10.1080/07075332.2023.2265375. ISSN 0707-5332.
  2. ^ Loades, David ed. (2003) The Reader's Guide to British History vol. 1, p. 329. ISBN 9781579584269
  3. ^ Pimlott (1985), p. 639.
  4. ^ a b c d e Charman 2013, p. 61.
  5. ^ "LSE Archives".
  6. ^ Great Britain. Committee on Industry and Trade, Factors in industrial and commercial efficiency (London: HMSO, 1927), ii.
  7. ^ Pimlott (1985), p. 66.
  8. ^ a b Frank 2008, p. 63.
  9. ^ a b c d e f g h Frank 2008, p. 64.
  10. ^ a b c d e f g Charman 2013, p. 62.
  11. ^ a b Bloom 1999, p. 144.
  12. ^ Charman 2013, p. 62-63.
  13. ^ a b c Pimlott, Ben (2004). "Dalton, (Edward) Hugh Neale, Baron Dalton (1887–1962)". Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (online ed.). Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/ref:odnb/32697. (Subscription or UK public library membership required.)
  14. ^ a b Keene 2012, p. 7.
  15. ^ a b Buchanan 2012, p. 55.
  16. ^ Buchanan 2012, p. 56.
  17. ^ a b c Shaw 2013, p. 84.
  18. ^ a b Colton 1966, p. 265.
  19. ^ Holroyd-Doveton, John (2013). Maxim Litvinov: A Biography. Woodland Publications. p. 378.
  20. ^ a b c Dalton, Hugh (1957). The Fateful Years; Memoirs 1931-1945. London: Frederick Muller. p. 97.
  21. ^ a b c Shaw 2013, p. 76.
  22. ^ a b c d e Shaw 2013, p. 92.
  23. ^ a b c d e Shaw 2013, p. 80.
  24. ^ Shaw 2013, p. 89.
  25. ^ a b Pimlott 1985, p. 254.
  26. ^ Aster 1973, p. 111.
  27. ^ Shaw 2013, p. 86.
  28. ^ a b c Shaw 2013, p. 94.
  29. ^ a b c Shaw 2013, p. 85.
  30. ^ a b c d e f g Smetana 2008, p. 110.
  31. ^ a b Shaw 2013, p. 169.
  32. ^ a b Shaw 2013, p. 170-171.
  33. ^ a b Shaw 2013, p. 170.
  34. ^ Shaw 2013, p. 180.
  35. ^ Shaw 2013, p. 177.
  36. ^ a b c d e Shaw 2013, p. 179.
  37. ^ Buchanan 2012, p. 80.
  38. ^ a b c d e Charman 2013, p. 63.
  39. ^ a b Charman 2013, p. 63-64.
  40. ^ a b Frank 2008, p. 62-63.
  41. ^ a b c Frank 2008, p. 65.
  42. ^ Tombs 2013, p. 10.
  43. ^ a b c d e Charman 2013, p. 64.
  44. ^ Charman 2013, p. 67.
  45. ^ Charman 2013, p. 68.
  46. ^ a b Charman 2013, p. 69.
  47. ^ Charman 2013, p. 70.
  48. ^ a b Seaman 2018, p. 126.
  49. ^ Frank 2008, p. 65-66.
  50. ^ Grantham 1979, p. 713-714.
  51. ^ a b c Grantham 1979, p. 714.
  52. ^ a b Frank 2008, p. 66.
  53. ^ a b Grantham 1979, p. 715.
  54. ^ a b c Grantham 1979, p. 716.
  55. ^ Grantham 1979, p. 717.
  56. ^ Grantham 1979, p. 718-719.
  57. ^ Grantham 1979, p. 719-720.
  58. ^ Grantham 1979, p. 722.
  59. ^ Grantham 1979, p. 724.
  60. ^ Gorny 2013, p. 178.
  61. ^ Gorny 2013, p. 178-179.
  62. ^ Gorny 2013, p. 179.
  63. ^ Grantham 1979, p. 723.
  64. ^ Grantham 1979, p. 724-725.
  65. ^ Gorny 2013, p. 181-182.
  66. ^ a b Morgan, Kenneth O. (1985) Labour in Power: 1945–1951. Ch. 2. ISBN 978-0192851505
  67. ^ Leo McKinstry 'Attlee and Churchill: Allies in War, Adversaries in Peace' Atlantic Books, 2020, chapter 26.
  68. ^ Winstanley, Asa (25 July 2017). "When Israel's friends in Labour advocated genocide". The Electronic Intifada. Retrieved 24 June 2024.
  69. ^ Bloom 1999, p. 150.
  70. ^ Howson, Susan (1987). "The Origins of Cheaper Money, 1945-7". Economic History Review. 40 (3): 433–452. doi:10.2307/2596254. JSTOR 2596254.
  71. ^ Nicholas Timmins, The Five Giants: A Biography of the Welfare State
  72. ^ Francis Beckett, Clem Attlee
  73. ^ Jefferys, Kevin The Attlee Governments 1945–1951
  74. ^ Pimlott (1985), pp. 524–48.
  75. ^ Pimlott (1985), pp. 558–64.
  76. ^ Matthew Hilton; et al. (2012). A Historical Guide to NGOs in Britain: Charities, Civil Society and the Voluntary Sector since 1945. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 187. ISBN 9781137029027.
  77. ^ a b c Buchanan 2012, p. 119.
  78. ^ a b c Tuck-Hong Tang 1992, p. 101.
  79. ^ a b c Buchanan 2012, p. 130.
  80. ^ Jefferys, Kevin (2002). Labour Forces: From Ernie Bevin to Gordon Brown. I.B.Tauris. p. 45. ISBN 9781860647437.
  81. ^ Pimlott (1985), p. 66
  82. ^ a b Bloch, Michael (2015). Closet Queens. Little, Brown. pp. 228–229. ISBN 978-1408704127.
  83. ^ Delaney, Paul (1987). The Neo-Pagans. Macmillan. pp. 49–50.
  84. ^ Bloch, Michael (2015). Closet Queens. Little, Brown. p. 230. ISBN 978-1408704127.
  85. ^ Davenport, Nicholas (1974). Memoirs of a City Radical. Weidenfeld. p. 171.
  86. ^ "Hugh Dalton's Diaries". LSE Digital Library. Retrieved 8 October 2021.
  87. ^ "No. 41942". The London Gazette. 29 January 1960. p. 764.
  88. ^ "LORD DALTON (Hansard, 3 February 1960)". api.parliament.uk.
  89. ^ Rogers, F. H. (2004). The Measurement and Decomposition of Achievement Equity. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University.
  90. ^ "Life Peerages – D". www.cracroftspeerage.co.uk.

Cited sources

[edit]
  • Aster, Sidney (1973). 1939: the making of the Second World War. New York: Simon and Schuster. ISBN 9780671216894.
  • Bloom, Cecil (March 1999). "The British Labour Party and Palestine, 1917—1948". Jewish Historical Studies. 36 (1): 141–171.
  • Buchanan, Tom (2012). East Wind China and the British Left, 1925-1976. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780199570331.
  • Charman, Terry (2013). "Hugh Dalton, Poland and SOE, 1940-1942". In Mark Seaman (ed.). Special Operations Executive A New Instrument of War. London: Taylor & Francis. pp. 61–70. ISBN 9781134175246.
  • Colton, Joel (1966). Leon Blum: Humanist in Politics. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. ISBN 978-0-307-83089-0. LCCN 65-18768. OCLC 265833.
  • Frank, Matthew (2008). Expelling the Germans British Opinion and Post-1945 Population Transfer in Context. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780191528477.
  • Gorny, Joseph (2013). The British Labour Movement and Zionism, 1917-1948. London: Taylor & Francis. ISBN 9781135169336.
  • Grantham, John T. (October 1979). "Hugh Dalton and the International Post-War Settlement: Labour Party Foreign Policy Formulation, 1943-44". Journal of Contemporary History. 14 (4): 713–729.
  • Keene, Thomas (2012). Cloak of Enemies Churchill's SOE, Enemies at Home and the Cockleshell Heroes. Cheltenham: History Press. ISBN 9780752483757.
  • Pimlott, Ben (1985). Hugh Dalton. Macmillan. ISBN 9780333412510. online
  • Seaman, Mark (2018). ""The Most Difficult Country": Some Practical Considerations On British Support for Clandestine Operations in Czechoslovakia during the Second World War". In Vit Smetana & Kathleen Brenda Geaney (ed.). Exile in London The Experience of Czechoslovakia and the Other Occupied Nations, 1939-1945. Prague: Charles University Press. pp. 122–132. ISBN 9788024637013.
  • Shaw, Louise Grace (2013). The British Political Elite and the Soviet Union. London: Taylor & Francis. ISBN 9781135761271.
  • Smetana, Vít (2008). In the Shadow of Munich British Policy Towards Czechslovakia from the Endorsement to the Renunciation of the Munich Agreement (1938-1942). Prague: Charles University Press. ISBN 9788024613734.
  • Tombs, Robert (2013). ""Two Great Peoples"". In Robert Tombs & Emile Chabal (ed.). Britain and France in Two World Wars Truth, Myth and Memory. London: Bloomsbury. pp. 1–16. ISBN 9781441130396.
  • Tuck-Hong Tang, James (1992). Britain’s Encounter with Revolutionary China, 1949–54. London: Tuck-Hong Tang. ISBN 9781349223497.

Further reading

[edit]

Primary sources

[edit]
  • Hugh Dalton, With British Guns in Italy (1919)
  • Hugh Dalton, Call Back Yesterday: Memoirs – 1887–1931 (1953)
  • Hugh Dalton, The Fateful Years: Memoirs – 1931–1945 (1957)
  • Hugh Dalton, High Tide and After: Memoirs – 1945–1960 (1962)

References

[edit]
  • Craig, F. W. S. (1983) [1969]. British parliamentary election results 1918–1949 (3rd ed.). Chichester: Parliamentary Research Services. ISBN 0-900178-06-X.
  • Dalton, H. The measurement of the inequality of incomes, Economic Journal, 30 (1920), pp. 348–461.
[edit]

Media related to Hugh Dalton at Wikimedia Commons

Parliament of the United Kingdom
Preceded by Member of Parliament for Peckham
19241929
Succeeded by
Preceded by Member of Parliament for Bishop Auckland
19291931
Succeeded by
Preceded by Member of Parliament for Bishop Auckland
19351959
Succeeded by
Political offices
Preceded by Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
1929–1931
Succeeded by
Preceded by Minister of Economic Warfare
1940–1942
Succeeded by
Preceded by President of the Board of Trade
1942–1945
Succeeded by
Preceded by Chancellor of the Exchequer
1945–1947
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Preceded by Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster
1948–1950
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Party political offices
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1936–1937
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